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Introduction 
Price increases are a widespread phenomenon in a variety of markets. Such increases 
can be driven by market factors or by a desire of the company to increase profit margins. 
Regardless of the purpose of price increases, consumers usually negatively react to them as 
they has a detrimental effect on their wellbeing. Under the unfavorable economic 
circumstances, when consumer behavior is characterized by the accelerating rationalization, 
economizing and the weakening of brand loyalty, the consumer response to price increases 
can be extremely harsh. To mitigate the negative consumer response to a price increase, 
companies can manage the way a price increase is presented to the market. Instead of raising 
the price for a product, the company can decrease the quantity/size of a product and remain 
the price of the product item unchanged. On the one hand, it allows keeping the product 
available for consumers; on the other hand, it makes hard to compare prices directly, which 
could be potentially perceived by consumers as unfair or deceptive (Zaltman, 1978; Hardesty, 
Bearden, Carlson, 2007).  
The motivation of marketers behind using pricing tactics that can mislead consumer 
from making an optimal choice is the possibility to get additional benefits. Marketers may not 
necessarily be trying to deceive consumers, but they are often affected nonetheless (Manning 
et al. 1998; Sprott et al. 2003). When describing their lives as consumers, people point out 
“the confusing, stressful, insensitive, and manipulative marketplace in which they feel trapped 
and victimized” (Fournier, Dobscha, Mick, 1998). Similarly McGraw and Tetlock (2005) 
reason: “Consumers who have been gulled into thinking of themselves as part of a corporate 
family or partnership may feel especially bitter when they discover that the other party was 
treating them along purely as objects of monetary calculation”. Thus, misleading marketing 
practices once successfully implemented can become a source of consumer dissatisfaction 
over time, as consumers learn and develop their marketing expertise together with marketers. 
Getting financial benefits at the expense of consumers’ welfare due to consumer’s inattention 
or limited knowledge in something can bring significant losses to the company, once 
consumers gain persuasion knowledge in the field. 
The questions the study intends to answer are the following: What are the potential and 
lost benefits, if any, for companies that use covert pricing tactics as compared to overt pricing 
tactics? What are the impacts, if any, of covert pricing tactics, both on the short-term and 
long-term relationships between a company and its consumers? How do the impacts of covert 
pricing tactics differ among consumers who possess the different kinds of knowledge on the 
usage of such pricing tactics in the marketplace? 
Theoretical Background 
1.1. The Framing of Price Increases: Total Price Increase vs Product Downsizing 
The price and its impact on consumers has always been a focal point in the economic 
and management disciplines. The schools of economic thought united under the aegis of 
neoclassical economics put the price on one of the central places in their research agenda. 
They focus on how price changes affect consumer demand for a good, but avoid scrutinizing 
the underlying psychological processes that lead the consumer to a buying or rejecting 
decision. Rather, neoclassical economics regards the consumer as a rational agent who is 
capable to make a precise and unbiased decision to maximize his own wellbeing. The 
blooming of positive economics armed with the psychological methods expands the narrow 
neoclassical focus. The consumer is not viewed as a purely rational agent anymore. Indeed, 
positive economics directs its research efforts towards revealing the real consumer behavior 
and the circumstances under which the predictions of neoclassical economics fail. 
In particular, traditional economic models treat price as the monetary sacrifice a 
consumer makes to acquire a product or service (Stigler, 1987) and assume that an individual 
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should make the same choice when faced with equivalent decision problems. Although these 
principles have been usefully applied to a variety of marketing problems, recent research on 
the psychological aspects of pricing suggests that the role of price might be more complex 
than anticipated by standard economic principles. In particular, a number of studies 
demonstrated that the way price information is presented, termed price framing (Tversky, 
Kahneman, 1981), often significantly influences perceptions of deal value. 
The nature of framing appears to differentially affect consumer perceptions of deals that 
are equivalent on a unit-cost basis but worded or presented differently (Sinha, Smith, 2000). 
In the field of pricing research, different frames of the equivalent price deals were 
compared: multiple vs single price changes (Mazumdar, Jun, 1993; Tsiros, Hardesty, 2013), 
absolute vs percentage price change formats (DelVecchio, Krishnan, Smith, 2007), product 
price vs product size changes (Chen, Marmorstein, Tsiros, Rao, 2013; Gourville, Koehler, 
2004; Kachersky, 2011), all-inclusive vs partitioned price presentations (Bambauer, Gierl, 
2008), etc. 
The frames of product price vs product size changes to present an equivalent unit-cost 
change has received their attention in the studies of both price decreases (often for 
promotional purposes) and price increases. Nevertheless, while the examination of promotion 
types started relatively earlier and generated more research because of their popularity in the 
marketplace, the opposite problem has relatively recently entered the scholarly domain. The 
framing of price increases in an overt (total price increase) or covert way (product downsizing 
i.e. reducing the volume of product per package without a proportional decrease in package 
price) leads to different consumer responses to changes that are equivalent on the unit-price 
basis. 
In a range of articles that compare the consumer demand sensitivity to an equivalent 
price increase and product downsizing, it is demonstrated that consumers are more sensitive 
to price over quantity/size changes because of either their unawareness of product size, 
inattention to unit prices, or relative uncommonness of product downsizing in the marketplace 
(Gourville, Koehler, 2004; Cakir, Balagtas, 2014). However, some studies does not prove that 
the differential sensitivity to differently framed price increases exists (Imai, Watanabe, 2014).  
Presumably, the difference in the response to overt vs covert unit price increase can be 
found not only at the level of behavioral achievements, but also at the level of consumer 
perceptions of alternatives. Numerous studies have shown that consumers’ acceptance of a 
price, particularly a price increase, depends on considering it “fair” (Kahneman, Knetsch, 
Thaler, 1986). Packaging, size, or feature differences that make it hard to compare prices 
directly could be potentially perceived by consumers as unfair or deceptive (Zaltman, 1978). 
Price fairness judgments involve a comparison of a price or procedure with a pertinent 
standard, reference, or norm (Xia, Monroe, Cox, 2004). In case of pricing, the overt raise of 
price per product could be regarded as such a fair standard, because such a way to increase 
price is clear and does not demand additional cognitive costs to evaluate the extent of price 
increase. On the contrary, product downsizing can be regarded by consumers as a 
manipulative intent of the company to mislead consumers from an optimal choice and thereby 
gain from consumer limited attention or unawareness. 
1.2. Consumer Knowledge on Pricing Tactics Usage 
Pricing tactics include marketers’ efforts to generate favorable price perceptions 
regarding their brands, stores, and offerings (Hardesty, Bearden, Carlson, 2007). Marketers 
use a variety of tactics to attract customers and persuade them to buy the product.  Some 
pricing practices mislead consumers leading to a suboptimal choice. For instance, quantity 
surcharges implies that unit price of a product packaged in a larger quantity is higher than the 
unit price of the same product and brand packaged in a smaller quantity, which is contrary to 
7 
 
a widespread consumer belief that the unit price of goods packaged in larger quantities is less 
(Palla, Boutsouki, Zotos, 2010). Obviously, when consumers rely on their beliefs about 
pricing practice that contradict the actual pricing practice, they burden themselves with 
additional financial load and decrease their wellbeing. 
When faced with the practice in routine life the consumer can be unaware of practice 
usage. The understanding of practice nature can be gained with experience. Consumers are 
more likely to accurately learn about the persuasive intent behind pricing tactics upon greater 
exposure to them in the marketplace (Carlson, Bearden, Hardesty, 2007). “Over time 
consumers develop personal knowledge about the tactics used in these persuasion attempts” 
(Friestad, Wright, 1994). Friestad and Wright (1994) introduced the Persuasion Knowledge 
Model (PKM) that describes how people's persuasion knowledge influences their responses to 
persuasion attempts, in particular, how people use their persuasion knowledge to refine their 
attitudes toward products and marketers. Persuasion knowledge guides consumers' attention 
to aspects of an advertising campaign or price presentation, providing inferences about 
possible background conditions that caused the agent to construct the attempt in that way 
(Friestad, Wright, 1994). When choosing a pricing tactic, producers are per se trying to find a 
persuading pricing message that will appeal to consumers in a better way. It considers the 
marketer to be the agent of persuasion, the consumer to be the target of persuasion, and the 
pricing tactic to reflect the persuasion attempt. Pricing tactic persuasion knowledge (PTPK) 
represents a form of domain-specific knowledge gained through experience (Hardesty, 
Bearden, Carlson, 2007). 
Marketing-literate consumers and those who are not armed with enough marketing 
knowledge and experience react differently to tactics employed by marketers. After 
conducting a series of experiments (Hardesty, Bearden, Carlson, 2007) identified that less 
knowledgeable consumers are more susceptible to such marketing practices as quantity 
surcharges and tensile claim offers and to making suboptimal decisions. (Kachersky, 2011) 
investigates consumer reactions to the practice of increasing unit prices of products by either 
reducing product content or increasing total prices. According to results, higher levels of 
PTPK lead consumers to infer different motives behind the two types of unit price increases, 
with content reductions being attributed to firm motives to increase profit margins and total 
price increases being attributed to firm motives to maintain profit margins in the face of 
situational factors such as cost inflation. Second, higher levels of PTPK lead consumers to 
look less favorably on product brands when the product content is reduced compared to when 
the total price is increased, and that this outcome is driven by inferred motives. Third, in 
contrast to high PTPK consumers, lower levels of PTPK lead consumers to alter their 
evaluations not of the product brand but of the retailer.  
Hypotheses Development 
When studying the behavior of consumers in the marketplace, the actual behavioral 
achievements are actually considered to be a consequence of psychological stances of the 
consumer. The theory of planned behavior proposes that a behavioral intention is formed 
based on the attitude towards the behavior (Ajzen, 1991), and if projecting the theory into the 
domain of consumer behavior, a buying intention can depend on such variables as consumer 
attitude to the product and trust to the producer of the product. The former construct has long 
been given a crucial role in bringing customer satisfaction, and gaining his loyalty 
(Olshavsky, Miller, 1972). Similarly, there are studies that describes consumer trust as a 
pivotal cornerstone and a key factor in the establishment of the relational commitment 
between firm and consumers (Reichheld, Schefter, 2000). 
Taking into account the possible misleading effect of the pricing tactic under review, it 
is possible to include the variables related to consumer fairness perceptions and judgments 
into the consumer response set. Price fairness being a buyer's judgment of a seller’s price can 
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significantly affect consumer behavior. Price fairness is a consumer’s assessment and 
associated emotions of whether the difference (or lack of difference) between a seller’s price 
and the price of a comparative other party is reasonable, acceptable, or justifiable (Xia et al, 
2004). Price fairness judgments may be based on previous prices, competitor prices, and 
profits (Bolton et al., 2003). In this case, the social norms are the rules that the community 
agrees sellers should follow when setting prices (Garbarino and Maxwell, 2010). Although 
consumers are able to quickly identify unfair situations, it is conversely more difficult for 
consumers to assess whether a policy is fair – that is why some studies use the concept of 
price unfairness instead (Bolton et al., 2003). Whether or not a pricing scheme improves the 
firm’s profit, the attribution of a negative motive to it will cause the perception of price 
unfairness (Campbell, 1999). 
Thus, three theoretically and managerially relevant antecedents of purchase intentions 
are identified for the analysis: product attitude, producer trust, and price unfairness. When 
proceeding with the hypothesis development, a more favorable effect of price increase on the 
specified variables is considered to have higher product attitude and producer trust 
evaluations, lower price unfairness evaluations, and higher purchase intention scores. 
In previous studies which compare the demand sensitivity to total price increase vs 
product downsizing, product downsizing is often proclaimed to be more effective (Gourville, 
Koehler, 2004; Cakir, Balagtas, 2013; Snir, Levy, 2011); however, there is also an evidence 
that the effect of these alternative practices could be the same (Imai, Watanabe, 2014). After 
closer examination of articles that produced the different conclusions, the contradiction can be 
attributed to (1) firstly, heterogeneity of consumers: consumers in different markets can have 
different apriori knowledge on pricing tactics used in the market and, thus, are different in 
terms of their ability to notice the product downsizing and validly evaluate the unit price 
change; (2) secondly, the time span covered by the analysis: superior effect of product 
downsizing is observed in the articles that investigate short-term effect of this pricing tactics, 
while the article that equates the effectiveness of total price increase and product downsizing 
covers a relatively longer time span.  
The other stream of studies of consumer reaction to misleading pricing tactics were 
focused on the question of what happens once consumers notice the unit price increase 
(Kachersky, 2011). However, it is reasonable to repeatedly suggest that at the point of 
purchase some consumers are able to activate their internal knowledge to detect the pricing 
tactics usage, while the others are not. When the pricing tactics usage leaves undetected, 
consumers will tend to underestimate the price change; thus, consumer reaction to a deal will 
likely differ as compared to those who are able to detect the pricing tactics usage. 
Nevertheless, consumers are permanently engaged in information exchanges with other 
market agents such as companies, consumers or media entities that can provide them with 
information on pricing tactics usage. Thus, the knowledge on pricing tactics usage can be 
gained through external sources after the interaction with a product whose price changed has 
already been accomplished. Such externally invoked knowledge can lead to the modification 
of consumer response to unit price increase during consequent interactions with the product. It 
can be supposed that if consumers do not notice the tactic at the point of purchase, they do not 
modify their response towards the product, but they may have especially harsh reactions if 
they discover the tactic via a fellow consumer or the media (Kachersky, 2011). 
To address the existing research gaps and contradictions, there is introduced a 
conceptual framework that incorporates the consumer heterogeneity and variability over time 
(Figure 1). Later on, we will refer to the short term as a period when consumers have no 
external information on the pricing tactics used in the marketplace and can rely only their 
personal internally invoked knowledge, while in the long term the consumer knowledge on 
pricing tactics usage can be externally invoked. 
9 
 
According to the framework, the presence or absence of consumer knowledge on 
pricing tactics usage will moderate the consumer response in the short term, while the source 
of consumer knowledge (externally or internally invoked) will affect the consumer response 
in the long term when consumers can get additional external information on the pricing tactics 
usage. Taking into account the specified moderating effects, the marginal effectiveness of 
product downsizing vs total price increase is expected to be higher in the short term than in 
the long term.  
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework 
 
 
 
Based on the conceptual framework, the following hypotheses are formulated: 
H1. The marginal benefit of product downsizing vs total price increase on consumer 
response is higher in the short term than in the long term. 
H2. The presence or absence of consumer knowledge on pricing tactics usage 
moderates the consumer response in the short term. 
H3.  The source of consumer knowledge moderates the consumer response in the long 
term.  
Research Design 
3.1 Method 
To test the specified hypotheses, the study uses an experimental method. Web-
experiment including both within-subject and between-subject designs is employed to 
compare the behavioral and psychological responses of different consumers to overt vs covert 
price increases over time. The survey structure is represented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Survey structure 
Time Description of Interaction 
Time 1  All respondents are provided with a concise description of the market 
situation and the picture of the product with a price (see Appendix 1 (a)): 
«The Russian company Ostankino sells milk under the brand name "36 
cents" on the Russian market. Picture and description of the product are 
given. Please indicate whether you agree with the following statements» 
Time 2  Respondents are randomly assigned to one of the two conditions (product 
downsizing vs equivalent overt price increase) in the proportion 60/40. 
Respondents are still provided with a concise description of the market 
situation (the same for all respondents) and the picture of the product with a 
price (different pictures depending on the assigned condition (see Appendix 
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1 (b) and (c) for product downsizing and overt price increase conditions): 
«The company decided to implement some changes to the product and 
adjust its price. Prices of other milk brands have not changed. Picture and 
description of the product, taking into account the changes are given. 
Please indicate whether you agree with the following statements” 
 All respondents are asked to evaluate the extent of price change by 
choosing one of the given options with different percentage changes. 
 The respondents exposed to product downsizing are asked whether they 
have noticed the size change. Depending on the answer they are divided in 
the two groups: Treatment 1 – those who detected the size change, and 
Treatment 2  - those who did not detected the sized change. 
Time 3  All respondents regardless of their previous answers are provided with the 
information on the extent of price increase. The respondents exposed to 
product downsizing are also informed that the price increase was partly 
accomplished through the reduction of the product quantity from 990 to 900 
ml: «Price per 1 liter increased by 13.6%. This was achieved by reducing 
product packaging from 990 to 900 ml (only for product downsizing 
condition). Have you changed your attitude to the product and the 
manufacturer after receiving this information? To answer this question, 
please indicate whether you agree with the following statements». 
At the second interaction (Time 2) the design of the product was slightly changed. It 
was done to distract consumer attention from the price change. The same redesign was 
accomplished for both product downsizing and overt price increase conditions. This practice 
is often used by marketers in the real market settings. Moreover, the general dynamics of the 
survey resemble the real-world flow of actions: as the prices on the market goes up, 
consumers modify their market behavior as a response to a price change depending on their 
personal judgments and perceptions (Time2), and afterwards consumers are provided with the 
exact information on the market price change that can go from either the official statistical 
sources, the media or the fellows (Time 3).  
At each interaction consumers are offered to evaluate whether they agree with particular 
statements which are intended to measure several conceptual constructs: purchase intention 
product attitude, producer trust, and price unfairness. The constructs are the same throughout 
the interaction timeline. Both unidimensional and multidimensional constructs are used. The 
reliability of multidimensional constructs are quite high at each time (see Table 2).  
Table 2. Construct indicators, measurement items, and reliability of measures 
Measures Items Time 1 
(α) 
Time 2 
(α) 
Time 3 
(α) 
Purchase 
intention 
I am ready to pay the stated price for the 
product. 
I would purchase this product in the store. 
I could buy this product on the next visit to the 
store. 
.86 .89 .88 
Product 
attitude 
I find this product interesting. 
I like this product. 
.78 .84 .92 
Producer 
trust 
I trust the producer of this product. 
- - - 
Price 
unfairness 
I consider the stated price of the product 
acceptable. 
The price of the product is unreasonably high. 
I think this price is unfair to consumers. 
.88 .88 .88 
Note. – All items are  measured using  7-point Likert scale with the points labeled as 1 = strongly 
disagree; 2 = moderately disagree; 3 = slightly disagree; 4 = neutral; 5 = slightly agree; 6 = moderately agree; 
and 7 = strongly agree. The reliability of multi-items scales is measured using Cronbach’s alpha. 
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Considering all the above consumer response variables, it is hypothesized the variables 
will behave differently in consumer groups exposed to different treatments (overt price 
increase vs product downsizing) over the consumer-product interaction trajectory. In addition, 
the different responses are expected among those consumers who detected the product 
downsizing vs those who did not detect that. Thus, three consumer groups are identified in the 
study: a) Control group (respondents who are randomly assigned to the total price increase 
condition); b) Treatment 1 (respondents who are randomly assigned to the product 
downsizing condition and detected the product downsizing); c) Treatment 2 (respondents who 
are randomly assigned to the product downsizing condition and did not detect the product 
downsizing). 
3.2 Sample and Context  
The experiment embraced 71 respondents of whom 48 respondents submitted a 
questionnaire via a social network in March 2015 and 23 respondents submitted the 
questionnaire in a printed format in April 2015. The purpose of the study is to investigate how 
the consumer response changes as a reaction to a unit price change. Consumers who initially 
gave maximum or minimum scores are deprived of a possibility to further change their 
opinion in a more positive or negative directions respectively, which can confound the results. 
To eliminate a possible confounding effect, only overlapping observations were taken for the 
analysis, while the observations with extremely low and high values at the pretest intervention 
were excluded. Following this logic, 8 observations were excluded from the analysis (4 
observations from the Control group; 2 – from the Treatment 1 group, and 2 – from the 
Treatment 2 group). The analyses proceeds with 63 observations: 19 observations in the 
Control group, 22 observations in the Treatment 1 group, and 22 observations in the 
Treatment 2 group.  
The questionnaire was provided in Russian and all responded were the residents of 
Russia. The context of Russia as an emerging market contributes to the research in several 
ways. Firstly, emerging markets are characterized with high consumer heterogeneity. The 
diversity with respect to access to products and services tends to be enormous between urban 
and rural households (Sheth, 2011). Many consumers have no brand or product knowledge. 
Often, they do not even know how markets operate. Thus, the topicality of the consumer 
knowledge proves to be very high and managerially relevant. Secondly, the economic 
turbulence and market changes that take place in Russia in the current time leads to the high 
price volatility, which put pressure on manufactures, on the one side, and endanger 
consumers, on the other side. Manufactures have to optimize their market strategies and often 
raise prices to compensate a high uncertainty. While consumers, in the face of lowering 
incomes, rationalize their behavior and put a special attention to price-related issues. 
Results 
4.1 ANOVA 
To test hypotheses the repeated-measures ANOVA is used as a method appropriate to 
longitudinal experiments in the marketing literature, in general, and exact research questions 
under investigation, in particular. 
Prior to running repeated-measures ANOVA, the data was checked for the existence of 
significant between-group differences at the baseline level (Time 1) using between-group 
ANOVA. The analysis revealed that there are no baseline differences among groups for all 
dependent variables: purchase intention (F(2,60) = 0.51, p = 0.60), product attitude (F(2,60) = 
0.90, p = 0.41), producer trust (F(2,60) = 0.06, p = 0.94), and price unfairness (F(2,60) = 2.23, 
p = 0.12). As the analysis does not reveal any differences among groups at the pretest 
interaction (Time 1), any differences among groups at the following interactions can be 
attributed to the treatment and moderation effects. 
Repeated-measures ANOVA was run on each of the consumer response indicators. 
Means and standard deviations across groups over time are provided in Table 3. Table 4 
presents the test statistics of main effects. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics on Consumer Response Measures (Means and Standard 
Deviations) 
Dependent variables Control group 
(n = 19) 
Treatment 1 
(n = 22) 
Treatment 2 
(n = 22) 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Purchase intention: 
Time 1 
Time 2 
Time 3 
3.51 
2.96 
2.93 
(0.98) 
(1.30) 
(1.23) 
3.86   
3.61 
3.42 
(1.02) 
(0.99) 
(1.02) 
3.73 
3.64 
2.98 
(1.27) 
(1.13) 
(1.13) 
Product attitude: 
Time 1 
Time 2 
Time 3 
4.37 
3.82 
3.71 
(0.86) 
(1.45) 
(1.36) 
4.11 
3.64 
3.50 
(1.02) 
(1.01) 
(0.88) 
3.93 
3.84 
3.48 
(1.13) 
(0.99) 
(1.10) 
Producer trust: 
Time 1 
Time 2 
Time 3 
4.21 
4.05 
4.11 
(1.40) 
(1.28) 
(1.17) 
4.09 
4.00 
3.77 
(0.90) 
(0.95) 
(1.20) 
4.14 
4.14 
3.36 
(1.01) 
(1.01) 
(1.33) 
Price unfairness: 
Time 1 
Time 2 
Time 3 
4.30 
5.19 
5.26 
(1.37) 
(1.25) 
(0.96) 
3.71 
4.53 
4.56 
(1.19) 
(1.05) 
(1.20) 
4.45 
4.52 
5.05 
(1.00) 
(1.15) 
(1.03) 
 
Table 4. Results of Repeated Measures ANOVA 
Dependent variables Between-group effect Within-group effect Interaction effect 
Purchase intention F(2,60) = 1.14,  
p = 0.33 
F(2,120) = 17.44,  
p = 0.00 
F(4,120) = 2.02,  
p = 0.09 
Product attitude F(2,60) = 0.30,  
p = 0.74 
F(2,120) = 14.58,  
p = 0.00 
F(4,120) = 0.89,  
p = 0.47 
Producer trust F(2,60) = 0.30,  
p = 0.74 
F(2,120) = 5.57,  
p = 0.00 
F(4,120) = 2.08,  
p = 0.09 
Price unfairness F(2,60) = 2.02,  
p = 0.44 
F(2,120) = 28.65,  
p = 0.00 
F(4,120) = 3.00,  
p = 0.02 
The results of repeated measures ANOVA indicate that there is a statistically significant 
within-group effect for all dependent variables i.e. there is a tendency of all consumer 
response variables to change in the same direction over time within all experimental groups. 
In particular, there is observed a deterioration of product attitude and producer trust, and 
acceleration of price unfairness perceptions over time, which results in the reduction of 
purchase intention. 
Between-group effect proved to be significant only as a part of interaction effect, which 
signifies that despite there is a common tendency within all experimental groups to react 
similarly in response to experimental interventions, the severity of consumer responses to 
interventions is different among groups. 
4.2 Analysis of Mean Differences 
Since the treatment-by-time interaction is significant, there is a need to explain the 
interaction. For further insight into the hypotheses, the analysis of mean differences is 
undertaken. Mean differences of consumer response variables in the short term (Time 2 vs 
Time 1) and long term (Time 3 vs Time 1) in there experimental groups are depicted in the 
Figure 2.  The statistical significance of mean differences among groups is presented in the 
Table 5. 
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Figure 2. Mean Differences of Consumer Response Variables across Time 
 
Short-Term Effect 
(Time 2 vs Time 1) 
Long-Term Effect 
(Time 3 vs Time 1) 
 
Purchase Intention 
 
 
Product Attitude 
 
 
 
Producer Trust 
 
Price Unfairness 
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Table 5. Results of Post-Hoc Analysis of Mean Differences 
Dependent variables Control group 
(Total price increase) 
Treatment 1 
(Product downsizing, 
Internally Invoked 
Knowledge) 
Treatment 2 
(Product downsizing, 
Externally Invoked 
Knowledge) 
Purchase intention 
Time 2 vs Time 1 
Time 3 vs Time 1 
 
 -0.54 ***    
 -0.58 ***  
 
               -0.26     
-0.44 ***    
 
             -0.09    
  -0.74 ***   
Product attitude 
Time 2 vs Time 1 
Time 3 vs Time 1 
 
 -0.55 ***   
 -0.66 ***  
 
-0.48 ***   
-0.61 ***  
 
             -0.09    
-0.45 **   
Producer trust 
Time 2 vs Time 1 
Time 3 vs Time 1 
 
            -0.16    
            -0.11    
 
               -0.09    
               -0.32   
  
              0.00     
 -0.77 ***    
Price unfairness 
Time 2 vs Time 1 
Time 3 vs Time 1 
 
  0.89 ***     
  0.96 ***    
 
  0.82 ***    
  0.85 ***   
 
              0.07    
   0.60 *** 
Note. – The significance of mean differences is tested using t-statistics. The asterisks signify the 
following significance levels: * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. 
The analysis of mean differences indicates that in the short run a statistically significant 
reduction in purchase intention in response to price increase is observed only when consumers 
are exposed to total price increase, while product downsizing does not lead to a significant 
reduction in purchase intention for both treatment groups. The short-term stability of purchase 
intention for the Treatment 2 group is explained by the unchanged antecedents of purchase 
intention (product attitude, producer trust, and price unfairness). On the contrary, the rapid 
shrinkage of purchase intention for the Control group is driven by the movement of 
antecedents (product attitude and price unfairness) to a less favorable direction. Despite the 
same trajectory of intention antecedents is observed in the Treatment 1 group, the intention 
does not change in the short run analogously to the Control group. The possible explanation 
of such a contradiction is that even when consumers are able to detect the product 
downsizing, they tend to err in their judgments regarding the price change and underestimate 
the scope of price increase (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Distributions of Consumer Evaluations of Perceived Unit Price Increase (by 
Groups) 
 
Note. –The multiple-choice question “How would you estimate the extent of unit price change?” was 
asked after consumers were presented with an increased price. The actual unit price increase accounted to 13.6%. 
No information on actual price increase was provided to consumers at that moment. 
The differences in consumer response to product downsizing depending on the presence 
or absence of consumer knowledge in the short run support the hypothesis 2 (H2): consumers 
who detect product downsizing change their product attitude and price unfairness judgements 
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in the short run, while those who does not detect product downsizing keep all consumer 
response variables unchanged. 
In the long run all experimental groups demonstrated a significant shrinkage of 
purchase intention. However, the Treatment 2 group underwent the most rapid reduction of 
purchase intention mostly driven by the deterioration of producer trust judgements, which 
supports the hypothesis 3 (H3) according to that the source of consumer knowledge 
moderates the consumer response in the long term. 
Such variability of consumer response to product downsizing over time supports the 
hypothesis 1 (H1) according to that the marginal benefit of product downsizing vs total price 
increase on consumer response is higher in the short term than in the long term. 
Conclusion 
The study can contribute to the existing research in several ways. Firstly, it interprets 
the existing research contradictions through the introduction of several moderating variables 
related to consumer knowledge. Secondly, it tries to go beyond the investigation of short-term 
effect of covert vs overt pricing tactics by simulating the long-term development trajectory of 
consumer-product relationships.  
The analysis revealed that even when consumers are able to detect the product 
downsizing, they tend to err in their judgments regarding the price change and underestimate 
the scope of price increase. That could be driven by the limited abilities to conduct valid 
mathematical calculations when both the nominator and denominator (that is, product size and 
total package price) change. Even in the absence of product downsizing, consumers did not 
provide a valid evaluation of price change scope, and product downsizing being a more 
mentally challenging way to frame a price change accelerates the tendency to make mistakes 
among consumers. Based on such metal limitations, covert (vs overt) unit price increase is 
proved to lead to a more positive consumer response in the short term when consumers have 
no access to external information and can rely only on their internal knowledge on covert 
pricing tactics usage.  
In the long term, when consumers have access to external information on covert pricing 
tactics usage, the effect of covert (vs overt) pricing tactics tends to become less favorable for 
companies. The long-term effect is moderated by the source of consumer knowledge on 
pricing covert tactics usage: consumers who managed to internally invoke the knowledge on 
pricing tactics usage react differently to covert unit price increase in the long term than those 
whose knowledge on pricing tactics usage was externally invoked. 
The narrow scope of the study in terms of analyzed sample and product categories being 
a limitation for the generalization of results becomes an alarm for future research with more 
broad and representative empirical data.  
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Appendix 1. Experimental stimulus 
(a) Stimulus 1 
 
(b) Stimulus 2(a) 
 
(c) Stimulus 2(b)  
 
 
Comments (not presented to respondents): 
Volume – 990 ml 
Price per 1 liter – 58.60 RUB 
(Initial baseline level) 
 
 
 
 
Volume – 900 ml 
Price per 1 liter – 66.50 RUB 
(+13.6% to the baseline – product downsizing) 
 
 
 
 
Volume – 990 ml 
Price per 1 liter – 66.50 RUB 
(+13.6% to the baseline – overt price increase) 
 
